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The objective of this article is to provide a critical evaluation of the empirical analysis in 
Robert Putnam et al’s (2005) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. 
We propose new measurements of the major concepts and also incorporate information 
about income inequality as a factor in the determination of institutional and economic 
performance, all in cross-national perspective. This article has two concerns.  Substantively, 
the research question posed is: what is the impact of the distribution of income on civic 
community, institutional performance and economic performance? We hypothesize that an 
equitable distribution of income leads to the development of a civic community, which in 
turn leads to institutional and socioeconomic performance. Methodologically, we consider 
the diffi culties that arise examining this hypothesis in cross-national perspective, as well 
as proposed solutions, especially with regards to data harmonization and measuring the 
main concepts.  The database of the World Values Survey (WVS) was used to test this 
hypothesis. The sample includes 49 countries that participated in the survey. Our re-
examination synthesizes aspects of Putnam et al’s book with the methodology of Knack 
and Keefer’s (1997) Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A key fi nding is that 
civism and active participation in organizations and associations, taken individually, have 
a negative effect on the determination of economic performance and consequently on 
institutional performance, a fi nding that differs from the results of Putnam et al (2005). 
The distribution of income had a negative and signifi cant effect on economic performance 
in the sense that in countries where income inequality is greater, economic performance 
was proportionally lower. This article proposes an analysis that focused more on economic 
factors than the analysis proposed by Putnam et al.
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socioeconomic development; income inequality
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INTRODUCTION
Robert Putnam et al’s (2005) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in 
Modern Italy1 is a pioneering work and a benchmark for subsequent studies on 
civic community and economic development. Putnam et al (2005) studied twenty 
regional governments in Italy between 1970 and 1989, seeking to understand 
which factors generated signifi cant differences in their institutional performance. 
In the model proposed by Putnam et al, every path leading to an explanation of 
institutional performance and regional socioeconomic development begins with 
civic community. Putnam et al fi nds that more civically-minded regions had better 
institutional performance and, consequently, higher socioeconomic development 
than those less civically involved. According to Putnam et al, differences in 
institutional performance frameworks highlight regional disparities: Northeastern 
and Central Italy are more economically developed regions, while the South, with 
its lower institutional performance, is less economically developed. This approach 
is critical in the ongoing debate.
Putnam et al places civic community at the starting point of his model but 
does not strongly specify different forms civic community. Yet civic community 
is often rooted in economic factors, such as comparatively greater levels of equity 
in distribution of income. In a civic community, trust is more likely to take hold, 
providing greater integration among individuals focused on collective action. This 
occurs in a society in which people generally share similar circumstances, i.e. 
where there is equity in material terms, rules and values – a situation provided by 
lower inequality in income. When considering Putnam et al’s study, it is therefore 
worth asking: what is the effect of the distribution of income on civic community, 
institutional performance and consequently on socioeconomic development?
In terms of the measurement of concepts, we see various problems with 
Putnam et al’s study.  In the variables tested by Putnam et al, trust stems from civic 
traditions and not from income distribution. Scholarship based on Putnam et al’s 
thesis would benefi t from a cross-national examination. This article reexamines 
Putnam et al’s arguments – specifi cally the impact of the distribution of income on 
the civic community and institutional performance – in cross-national perspective. 
The object of this article is to provide a critical evaluation of the empirical analysis 
in Putnam et al (2005). We propose new measurements of the major concepts and 
incorporate information about income inequality as a factor in the determination 
of institutional and economic performance, all in cross-national perspective. The 
article has two concerns.  Substantively, the research question posed is: what is the 
impact of the distribution of income on civic community, institutional performance 
and economic performance? We hypothesize that an equitable distribution of 
income leads to the development of civic community, and that in turn leads to 
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institutional and socioeconomic performance. Methodologically, we consider the 
diffi culties that arise when examining this hypothesis in cross-national perspective, 
as well as proposed solutions, especially with regards to data harmonization and 
quantifi cation of the main concepts. Our re-examination synthesizes aspects of 
Putnam et al’s book with the methodology of Knack and Keefer’s (1997) Does 
Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff?
Civic community, institutional performance and socioeconomic development
In Community and Democracy, Putnam et al analyzes the infl uence of socioeconomic 
factors on institutional performance in the light of socioeconomic modernity.2 
The possibility of this infl uence is linked to the consequences of the Industrial 
Revolution, when large crowds migrated from the countryside and agricultural 
activity gave way to urban and suburban factory work.
To test this assertion, Putnam et al evaluated the correlation between economic 
modernity and institutional performance. The economic modernity indicator used 
by Putnam et al is measured by a factor score based on per capita income and 
gross regional product, the plots of the workforce employed in agriculture and 
industry and in the fi elds of value added for agriculture and industry, all in the 
period 1970-77 (Putnam et al, 2005, footnote 4, p. 222). The crossing of economic 
modernization and institutional performance variables results in a correlation 
of 0.77. This result, according to Putnam et al (2005), pales before a stronger 
correlation between institutional performance and civic community. This leads 
the author to claim that economic modernization is not a key variable explaining 
institutional performance; he then focuses his research on civic community as an 
explanation of institutional performance.
According to Putnam et al, a civic community is characterized by its members’ 
participation and interest in public issues and the collective welfare rather than in 
purely individual and private concerns (Putnam et al 2005). The civic community 
variable is composed by four indicators of regional civic life: sociability, civism, 
mass media consumption (newspaper readers), index of voter turnout and the 
composite index of preferential voting. The author also considered the origin of civic 
community through history. According to Putnam et al (2005), civic community 
originates in the traditions of civic participation of Italian society, i.e. the continuity 
of civic values and the building on historical antecedents to contemporary Italy. 
This variable is based on fi ve indicators of traditions of civic participation in the 
period 1920-1960, namely: membership in societies of mutual assistance; number of 
cooperatives per capita; the strength of socialist and popular parties; voter turnout; 
and local associations founded before 1860. Civic community is a contemporary 
variable rooted in civic traditions.
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Community participation and involvement in programs and projects supporting 
regional development are closely linked to cultural characteristics related to trust, to 
norms of civic cooperation and to the accumulation of social capital (Putnam et al, 
2005). Civic community and institutional performance correlate at 0.92 according 
to Figure 4, Chapter 4. Putnam et al (2005) compares this result to the correlation 
between socioeconomic modernity and institutional performance, fi nding that 
institutional performance is more strongly correlated to civic community than to 
socioeconomic modernity. Putnam et al’s empirical analysis leads him to conclude 
that a “culturalist” thesis is the best explanation of institutional performance in Italy. 
This “sociocultural” hypothesis, which Putnam et al contrasts with a materialist 
outlook, is understandable. However, the composition of the variables used in his 
statistical analyses is unclear. Although Putnam et al defi nes trust as the foundation 
of civic community, none of the variables that comprise civic traditions and civic 
community have indicators of equality, cooperation or trust among their constitutive 
elements. We therefore see an unclear theoretical relationship between, on the one 
hand, the concept of civic community and its origin and, on the other, the variables 
tested in Putnam et al’s research. Furthermore, the connections Putnam et al draws 
between “socioeconomic factors” and “modernity” and between “sociocultural” 
factors and “civic community” are also murky. This lack of clarity presents some 
problems. We propose that, in the context of equality, cooperation and trust, civic 
community may have deeper roots extending to a factor of a more economic sort: 
the equitable distribution of income. 
The degree of political participation of a society involves both the presence and 
strength of certain features within the community: trust, norms of cooperation – 
social capital – equity and equality of conditions. The strength of these features 
– as well as their potential for development – is linked to income equality. In 
democratic societies where power is not monopolized and property is not held in 
the hands of the few, where social gaps are relatively small and there are equal 
opportunities, it is expected that communities are able to promote a network of 
ties and can work towards making full use of regional capabilities. This, in turn, 
leads to increased development (Ramos and Marino 2004). According to Paiva 
(2004), social capital, which results from social interaction, boosts the economic 
system (increasing production and productivity of the system), thereby becoming 
an economic resource that is not privately appropriable. Capital thus fi nds its basis 
in a solid trading system which itself depends on trust. 
Therefore, as a society develops, a more equitable distribution of income 
generates overall trust and cooperative mechanisms such as social capital. These, 
in turn, reduce transaction costs and facilitate economic activities, promoting 
socioeconomic development. The institutional performance of governments is 
related to their capacity to respond to economic demands as well as social ones. 
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When the conditions that give rise to economic development intensify, so do the 
requirements for government effi ciency. 
Putnam et al (2005) considers good institutional performance as entailing the 
ability to solve problems and serve the community through the effi cient use of 
available resources. In his view, civic community consists of informed individuals 
(such as newspaper readers) who interact politically through active participation 
in debates and discussions with peers about the problems that affect them; these 
individuals deliberate on how to address such issues. Yet, institutional performance 
is characterized by “meeting the demands of the community,” whereas civic 
community is, by defi nition, an organized community which has expressed its 
collective interest. We suspect a tautology, here. Civic and democratic cultures 
are both indicators of civic community; they generate civilized and democratic 
practices, which are themselves indicators of institutional performance.
Putnam et al points out that horizontal systems of civic participation are the 
foundation of civic community and that “trust itself is an emergent property of 
the social system, as much as a personal attribute” (2005, p. 186) and further that 
this social context is anchored in history. Yet he does not make explicit enough the 
origin of civic community.
When developing such arguments, Putnam et al’s analysis proceeds from 
economic elements: “the prospects for real democracy depend on social 
development and economic well-being” (Putnam et al, 2005, p. 26). These forms 
of organization, the horizontal and vertical systems highlighted by Putnam et 
al, can be determined by factors such as income distribution, consisting of an 
alternative vision of income distribution, which helps assess civic community, 
institutional performance and socioeconomic development. We argue that an 
equitable distribution of income produces trustworthy behavior. That is, democratic 
societies with fair procedural rules, good governance and substantial equity in 
income develop standards of reliability and advance social trust more signifi cantly 
than ethnic and cultural homogeneity (You 2005).
DATA AND VARIABLES
Our methodology relies on the work of Knack and Keefer (1997), who highlight 
the relevance of ethno-cultural homogeneity associated with the generation of trust 
and civic norms. However, the tests presented here are not depicted as a response 
to the ones devised by Knack and Keefer (1997), since, beyond the adjustments 
made to the data, the hypothesis tested in their study has different specifi cations. 
We used their test only as a reference on which to base our analysis.
We used an expanded sample and developed empirical tests3 using the databases 
from the World Values Survey (WVS) for the period 2005-20064 and European 
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Values Survey (EVS) (2000) for 49 countries. The World Value Survey 2005-2006 
contains data from 76,303 respondents in 52 countries, with one country observed 
in 2004, 13 countries observed in 2005, 21 countries observed in 2006, 15 countries 
observed in 2007 and two countries in 2008.  Among these it was necessary to 
eliminate three. Andorra was discarded as no data was obtained from the IMF 
and the World Bank regarding per capita income at the beginning of the period, 
annual growth rates over the period and the Gini income at the beginning of the 
period, which would have been detrimental for inclusion in the regression testing. 
Hong Kong was discarded as the questionnaire was incomplete and information 
on group participation differed. Finally, Iraq was rejected as no reliable data was 
obtained for the growth rate of GNP over the period and many questions about the 
degree of trust in public institutions were either unanswered or had a small number 
of respondents. 
As a result, the combination of these two datasets yielded 49 countries. It is 
important to emphasize that we adjusted the sample using the WVS of 2005 as 
the basis. It is also important to clarify that we did not simply add information 
about countries from each dataset since sometimes the same country appeared in 
multiple waves of the surveys. And lastly, as noted, some countries were not used 
due to insuffi cient information on them in the databases.
The remaining 49 countries were classifi ed according to the reliability of the 
information available using the following criteria: 1) the number of years with 
available information on GNP, and only those for which complete information 
was obtained from 1980 to 2006 were considered reliable enough; 2) the existence 
of information on independent variables for this period. Only those countries that 
relied on information consistent with contemporary values that were then used 
as proxies of these variables over the period were considered reliable; 3) the 
availability of all the values used in the construction – by aggregation or mean 
of different indicators – of variables serving as independent compound indices. 
Only countries that provided all of the relevant information were considered 
reliable.
It is important to emphasize that the questionnaires used in the both surveys 
have been modifi ed over time. Moreover, the number of countries where these 
surveys are being applied has broadened. Thus, there was a variation both in the 
countries where the surveys were carried out, as well as in the questions and possible 
responses. Due to the research’s lack of uniformity – marked by a strong tendency 
to expand the sample and increase the quality of informational questionnaires 
over time – it was necessary to reconcile the information from the period, which 
allowed us, where justifi ed, to operate with essentially the information from the 
World Values Survey of 2005 - 2006 as a proxy for past years.
It is worth paying attention to the following cases: 
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1) Germany: the data for this country referred to the period before unifi cation 
(1990) and therefore relates exclusively to West Germany.
2) China: it was not characterized as a capitalist country that has undergone 
conversion because it has not yet gone through the socially and politically disruptive 
processes that characterized the former USSR and other countries which adopted 
a collectivist system after World War II in Eastern Europe.
3) Colombia: the civism variable was not able to be fully calculated, as no 
information was available for responses to “whether it can ever be justifi ed to 
avoid a fare on public transport.” All other information was available, and in order 
not to exclude the research about this country, the value of the arithmetic mean of 
the other three items which make up the civism variable, and which were available 
for Colombia, were applied to this question.
 4) Egypt: our variable “mean trust in public institutions” is obtained by the 
arithmetic mean of trust in 10 institutions with public functions. In the case of 
Egypt, information was collected only regarding trust in the press, television, trade 
unions and public services. In order not to exclude this country, for which all other 
information was available, we included only these four items in the “mean trust in 
public institutions” variable. 
5) Moldova: the sample did not include people interviewed without college 
degrees. It is believed that this fact is due to a peculiarity of the sample that is 
not strictly representative of the population. This is evidenced by the fact that 
the mean years of schooling of the population of Moldova (6.14) is superior to 
those of other countries and a signifi cant percentage of Moldova’s population has 
a college degree. 
6) Peru: none of the questions used to calculate the civism variable was reported 
in research carried out in this country.
7) Rwanda: the questions “trust in the military” and “trust in government” were 
not subject to survey research. The “mean trust in public institutions” variable was 
thus calculated on the basis of the other 8 items. 
8) Trinidad and Tobago: the per capita income in the initial period is surprisingly 
high. Throughout the period, the per capita income falls systematically until 
the year 1989, when it reaches the value of U.S. $ 3569.04. In 1993 it is U.S. $ 
3675.43. And at the end of the period in 2006 it is U.S. $ 14,923.46. Apparently, 
the variations are highly infl uenced by the exchange rate and do not correspond 
strictly to the standard of living of the inhabitants of the country. 
9) Vietnam: It was not characterized as a capitalist country which has undergone 
conversion as explained in the case of China above.
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Variables
Institutional performance indicators 
Putnam et al considers trust in public institutions to be a good measure of the 
quality of government. According to the him, “to exhibit  good performance, 
a democratic institution has to be both sensitive and effective, responsive to the 
demands of their electorate and effective in its use of limited resources to solve 
those demands” (Putnam et al, 2005: 25). Therefore, substantial trust in public 
institutions is a characteristic of a society satisfi ed with the performance of the 
government. 
Like Knack and Keefer, we adopted the faith in government as a proxy variable 
of institutional performance used by Putnam et al. We identifi ed the degree of trust 
in government with the percentage of respondents in the WVS and EVS who had 
“great trust” and “medium trust” in public institutions: a) Armed forces, b) Print 
Media; c) TV Media, d) Unions; e) Police f) Judicial System; g) Government h) 
Political parties; i) Parliament; j) Public Services according to items listed below. 
We combined those who responded with “little trust,” “no trust” and “do not 
know.”
Trust, civism and group indicators 
The variable “trust”5 (trust in 2005) is measured by the percentage of people 
who agree more with the statement “most people can be trusted” than with the 
statement “you need to be very careful in dealing with people” within the total of 
respondents, after removing  “do not know” responses. The variable “trust” that 
is being presented at this time is a measure of generalized trust. Trust in people 
is anonymous and not only in groups with kinship or friendship. This variable 
corresponds to the trust variable used by Knack and Keefer (1997).  This variable 
was composed of measures related to the fi rst half of 1980, the fi rst half of 1990 
and the fi rst half of 2000. As mentioned earlier, the design of the WVS database 
originated in Europe in 1981 and was expanded from that time to countries 
worldwide. As a result of this expansion, it should be noted that for the year 1980 
there is information for only 12 countries, for 1990 the data is available for only 
13 countries. In other words, for the two periods mentioned, there is no data for the 
totality of the 49 countries of the sample. 
Due to the small number of cases for the years preceding the period 2000-2005, 
we performed a correlation test for the measures “trust 80,” “trust 90” and “trust 
05” which resulted in a high correlation and thus stability in trust over time. This 
refl ects the fact since trust is an aspect of the cultural life of people and thus one 
that does not change abruptly. As a result, we were able to use “trust 05” as a proxy 
for trust in past years where the latter information was not available.
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The civism variable proposed by Knack and Keefer was reconstructed using 
the WVS database in the period 2005 to 2006.6 As used in this article, this variable 
is measured by the sum of the averages of responses to four items:
a)  whether it can ever be justifi ed to claim government benefi ts to which you 
are not entitled;
b) whether it can ever be justifi ed to avoid a fare on public transport;
c) whether it can ever be justifi ed to cheat on taxes if you have a chance;
d)  whether it can ever be justifi ed for someone to accept a bribe in the course 
of their duties.
The result is the average approval, measured by individual scores from 1 to 10. 
In the scale used WVS questionnaire, higher numbers indicated greater acceptance 
of the acts in question, and thus we reversed the scale, such that high values would 
indicate less tolerance for these acts and thus a greater sense of civism. 
The indicators that comprise the civism variable (Civic) used in this study 
do not coincide with the component indicators of the civism variable used by 
Knack and Keefer (1997) because the questionnaire administered in the 2005-
2006 version of the WVS survey has changed. Fortunately, these changes follow 
the same direction as the WVS database – 1990 towards achieving the proposed 
objective, causing no damage to the reconstitution of this variable.
It is worth detailing the difference in the composition of our civism variable 
and that of Knack and Keefer (1997). The civism variable used in our work is 
composed of four indicators, as mentioned above. The civism variable used by 
Knack and Keefer (1997) is composed of fi ve indicators of civism, of which the 
fi rst three are identical. Their fi nal two variables concern (d) whether it is ever 
justifi able to keep money that you have found and (e) whether it is ever justifi able 
to fail to report damage you’ve done accidentally to a parked car; our fourth 
variable, concerns (d) whether it is ever justifi able for someone to accept a bribe 
in the course of their duties.
Another difference between these two variables is that Knack and Keefer use 
a scale of one to ten for fi ve response options which make up the civism variable. 
Thus the maximum value for this scale is 50 points while the minimum is fi ve 
points. Our civism variable uses the average score over the four questions presented.
Like the trust variable, the number of countries for which the civism variable 
can be calculated is low in earlier years of the survey. In the early 1980’s there is 
only information relating to 10 countries, while the early 1990’s still only provide 
information for 21. As we did for the trust variable, we tested the correlation of the 
civism variables in 1980, 1990 and 2005 to determine whether the 2005 variable 
could be used as a proxy for the entire period. A very low level of correlation 
suggested that that the Civic 2005 variable is not a particularly good proxy for the 
civism variable as a whole.
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It is worth noting that this result is not surprising, since the variable is defi ned by 
civic attitudes toward cooperating with others (strangers) or regarding the expected 
behavior of people. According to Knack and Keefer (1997), the correlation between 
civism and trust resulted in a correlation coeffi cient of 0.39. Knack and Keefer 
suggest this result is probably due unreliability of the civism variable, since one 
cannot know whether people do as they say, i.e. if survey responses correspond to 
real behavior. Nevertheless, the civism variable – Civic 2005 – measured by the 
sum of the averages of the four categories previously referred to in the period of 
2005, has been maintained as a proxy for civism in previous years.
Following Knack and Keefer (1997) we constructed variable groups: P-groups 
(Putnam et al groups) and O-groups (Olson groups) for the WVS - 2005/2006. 
These variables were constructed according to the requirements present in the 
2005/2006 version of the WVS questionnaire. Since these questions do not fully 
match those of the same questionnaire that serves as a reference for the work 
of Keefer and Knack, the P-groups and O-groups used in this work are also not 
strictly identical. Nevertheless, we sought to preserve the criteria used by Knack 
and Keefer in differentiating the groups.
To compose the variables “Gruperten05” (membership in a group) and 
“Grupativo05” (degree of activity within those groups) we used as reference 
the results of the questionnaires from the World Values Survey - WVS (2005 - 
2006),7 in which a list of organizations / voluntary associations was shown and the 
following questions were asked:
“Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each one, 
could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not 
a member of that type of organization? (Read out and code one answer for each 
organization): 
a) church or religious organization;
b) sport or recreational activity;8
c) art, music or educational organization;
d) labor union;
e) political party;
f) environmental organization;
g) professional organization;
h) humanitarian or charitable organization; 9
i) consumer organization;10
j) any other (write in).”
If the respondent belongs to and participates in an organization or association, 
he or she is assigned the value of two. If the respondent belongs to but does not 
participate in any organization or association, he or she is assigned the value of 
one, and if he or she does not belong to any organizations or associations, he or 
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she is assigned the value zero (Gruperten05). The questionnaire used for WVS - 
90 had the following possible answers to this question: “belongs” and “does not 
belong.” In the questionnaire used for WVS 2005/2006 the answer options are 
“active member,” “inactive member” (Grupativo05) and “does not belong.” Due 
to this change in the WVS survey instrument - 2005/2006, and in order to make it 
compatible with the information used by Knack and Keefer for the WVS - 90, we 
merged “active member” and “inactive member” into a single category of “belongs” 
in order to have equivalence with previous surveys for the Gruperten05 variable.11 
This item corresponds to those who belong to independent groups, regardless of 
their level of involvement. From this, we combined the number of respondents 
who belong to any organization for all items that match the construction of the 
indicator and divided that number by the total respondents.
Comparing our results with the study made by Knack and Keefer (1997) 
presented before and looking at the data from WVS 2005/2006, we found that 
the ten items collected in this question – corresponding to those used by Knack 
and Keefer – are different because the questionnaires changed during this period. 
However, since the purpose of this article is to perform analysis using data for the 
years 1981, 1990 and 2005/2006, it was necessary to reconcile the information 
over the period in question.12
Before doing so, we matched the items from both years, namely 1990 and 
2005/2006 for the construction of the variable Groups - 2005. In a second step, we 
tried to replicate the construction of indicators for WVS -1981 and WVS - 1990 
and to harmonize them with the items WVS - 2005/2006.13 Reconciliations of 
these are available upon request to the authors.
To compose the P-groups (Putnam et al groups) and O-groups (Olson groups) 
variables, we used the same indicators used by Knack and Keefer. The variable 
“P-GrupKK05” refers to sports or recreational organizations/associations, 
artistic, musical or educational organizations/associations, and others that were 
identifi ed as those groups least likely to act as “distributional coalitions” but 
which involved social interactions that can build trust and cooperative habits. The 
variable “O-GrupKK05” includes trade unions; political parties, and consumer 
organizations/associations, which were considered most representative of groups 
with redistributive goals.
Indicators of Trust in the System 
While the proxies of the variables used by Putnam et al and developed by Knack 
and Keefer seem relevant based on available information in the WVS and it was 
worthwhile reproducing them in the tests conducted in this study, they are not 
strictly equivalent to the variables with which Putnam et al operates. He used 
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a number of years and a sizable volume of primary interviews and surveys which 
enabled the increasing refi nement of the variables. While being critical of the 
construction of some variables in Putnam et al’s work through factor analysis, 
there is no doubt that they synthesize a set of cultural elements as well as trust and 
sociability patterns much broader than the simple variables articulated by Knack 
and Keefer (1997) from WVS questionnaires that were updated here. 
We argue that the civism variable, obtained from WVS and based on the 
self-reported behavior, is unreliable. The same argument can be brought up in 
regards to the relevance of the group variables. Especially in countries where 
non-participation in communal and religious activities is likely to be frowned 
upon (as in Muslim countries, for example), it is expected that a non-negligible 
number of respondents who declare themselves members – active or not – of such 
organizations are, in fact, non-members. 
The trust variable, as constructed by Knack and Keefer (1997), retrieves only the 
trust of respondents in other individuals, but not the trust in social institutions. In 
particular, it is not concerned with trust in an ethical and socially consistent pattern 
of relationships established within civil society that are not strictly individual, but 
are permeated by the action of institutions focused on commercial gain.
In seeking to address this set of limitations, we established a new indicator 
from available information in the WVS which we called “Trust in the System.” 
This indicator consists of the following variables: 
TrComp– The variable “work pays” is measured by the percentage of those 
who agree more with the words “long-term work pays” than the phrase “getting 
rich is a matter of relationships and luck.”
ExGanGan– This variable refers to the percentage of respondents who reported 
more agreement with the words “wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone” 
than with the term “people can only get rich at the expense of others.” 
ConfGrandEmpr– This variable is the sum of the percentages of respondents 
who reported “a great deal” and “quite a lot” as a measure of trust in big business, 
as opposed to those who responded “not very much” or “not at all.”
Economic performance indicators
Putnam et al uses a socioeconomic development variable measured by economic 
modernity, recognizing that it is a static measure of end point, i.e., that it is 
analyzed at the end of the period. Therefore in the tests carried out in this study we 
chose to use economic performance, a dynamic variable measured by the variation 
rate of gross national product during the studied period. Economic performance 
is measured by TxvarPNB, which is the geometric average of annual variation of 
GNP measured in national currency at constant prices.14 
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As with Knack and Keefer (1997), the GDP80 variable was used to measure 
income per capita at the beginning of the studied period. The authors emphasize 
that the impact of trust on growth should be higher in poorer countries, i.e., 
trust is essential in places where contracts are not properly enforced by the legal 
system and where access to formal credit is more limited due to the presence of an 
underdeveloped fi nancial sector. 
Consequently, the variable used here to measure per capita income in the early 
period was PNBpercapinper, measured by mean gross national product of the fi rst 
four years of the studied period, in U.S. dollars and calculated at current exchange 
rates.15
Income indicators
The distribution of income variable was measured by the Gini index, which 
measures income inequality in several countries. This variable presents some 
peculiarities, as the Gini indices of each country are not comparable. Those 
characteristics are the indicators used in research to measure the income of the 
population in several countries. In Brazil, for example, a survey of census data 
with regard to family monetary income refers to the month of the survey. Also, 
the income indicator used in population censuses somewhat reduces the effective 
real income, since beyond their monetary income, these families have agricultural 
production for self-consumption, which is noted but not counted.
Agricultural production for self-consumption is also not counted for developed 
capitalist countries, but in these countries the percentage of rural population is 
signifi cantly lower, so the underestimation of the real income of growers caused 
by this accounting standard is proportionally less. By contrast, some countries with 
a high percentage of rural population adopt standards of accounting for family 
income that are not only based on money. This will imply different standards of 
accounting of the value of rural, non-monetary income in a gradient that goes 
from the value that similar goods (grains, milk, fresh produce, and the like) have 
in the urban environment to the monetary value that could be achieved by the sale 
of such products in rural areas. Objectively, what matters here is that, depending 
on the standard of accounting for non-monetary rural income and the expression 
of this portion of product in overall national income, one can obtain more distinct 
levels of concentration of income in the same country.
Due to this fact, researchers at the United Nations University (UNU) generated 
different indicators of income distribution to calculate the rate of inequality of 
income and consumption for a large number of countries, utilizing offi cial criteria 
that have been adopted in various parts of the world.
This type of research was developed further by an academic at the Department 
of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Frederick Solt, 
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who used in his research two types of Gini indices, namely, a Gini index of 
gross income inequality with values before government taxation, i.e. the amount 
that people earn before tax, and a Gini index based on net available income, 
corresponding to the amount of people’s income after taxation. It is necessary 
to draw this distinction because in countries where most of the taxes are levied 
directly on income (e.g. income tax) the amount received in terms of income is 
different from the amount that people enjoy, i.e. available income.16
For this reason, two measures of income inequality were used in our article:
– GiniNetSolt80-85 = mean (over the years 1980 and 1985) of the Gini indices of 
net income countries calculated by Frederick Solt within the program “Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database” (SWIID);
– GiniGrossSolt 80-85 = mean (for the years 1980 and 1985) of the Gini indices 
of gross income countries in SWIID.
Education indicators
The education variable (Analf15years80) is measured as the percentage of illiterate 
persons among the total population over 15 years of age in the early 1980’s. This 
indicator was obtained for the year 1980 or the closest year for which census 
information was available in the sample countries. The sources of information 
were obtained from UNESCO and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
Capitalist conversion 
The capitalist conversion variable is a dummy variable that specifi es whether 
a country underwent conversion from a socialist to capitalist system during the 
period for which we have information about the average performance of the sample 
countries. This variable was introduced to prevent the economic disturbances 
associated with the turmoil of revolution from masking any positive contributions 
to development of trust and economic growth resulting from income and property 
distribution.
This masking could be understood as follows: 1) the countries with a socialist 
past have relatively democratic distributional patterns even now, despite the 
concentration of ownership associated with conversion to capitalism; 2) the 
political turbulence associated with the process of capitalist restructuring strongly 
depressed economic growth rates over several years; and 3) this period of low 
growth (or even negative growth) has had a signifi cant impact on the average 
rate calculated for these countries, especially where the conversion process was 
associated with the earlier dismemberment of large political units (in particular 
for the USSR and Yugoslavia). In these cases, the number of years for which 
there is information on the economic performance of the new market economies 
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is comparatively lower than the number of years for which there is available 
information for countries that did not experience these processes. There were 
two alternatives regarding the use of information for these countries: excluding 
them completely, which would have meant losing a representative portion of the 
sample, or including them and regarding them as a transitional stage in which 
some countries had, for some years, very low economic growth rates compared to 
others. We chose the latter.
It is also important to emphasize that PNB, education indicators and capitalist 
conversion variables were included in the models as controls, to help make 
comparisons between the countries.
RESULTS
This section summarizes the empirical fi ndings of our research about the impact of 
economic factors on civic community and institutional performance.
One of our aims was to determine which variables – among those used by 
Putnam et al (civism and groups) or those linked to the socioeconomic hypothesis 
(in the sense discussed in our article) – are privileged by the system solely due 
to empirical-statistical determinations. To determine which factors explain 
institutional performance, we used linear regression with a stepwise method 
in order to identify effective independent variables (relevant and signifi cant) 
among a wide set of variables, called here “potential independent variables”; i.e., 
variables that are part of different theoretical models (and even to some degree, 
competitors like the one we advocated in this article and Putnam et al’s hypothesis) 
of explanation for institutional performance. The aim of this method is to allow 
our statistical software (SPSS 14.0 in this case) to select the variables that enter 
into the equation gradually, due to their signifi cance and representativeness in the 
determination of the dependent variable and without the researcher’s interference 
and induction. It should be remembered that the statistical software used does 
precisely that: it selects the variables that enter into the equation gradually due 
to their signifi cance and representativeness in the determination of the dependent 
variable without interference and induction of the researcher. Accordingly, the 
software may exclude a variable because it is not signifi cant or presents high 
correlation with other variables (multicollinearity). One important aspect that 
should be stressed is that we used separated models, and thus cannot talk about 
reciprocal or indirect effects. Although the use of simultaneous models, such as 
Structural Equation Models, would have allowed us to do so, we were limited by 
the small number of cases we had (49 countries).17
The variables entering the stepwise regression test are:
– Dependent Variable: ConfMediaInstPub (mean trust in public institutions)
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– Potential independent variables: TxvarPNB, PNBpercapinper, GiniNetSolt80-85, 
GiniGrosSolt80-85, ReconvKista , ConfGrandEmp, TrComp, ExGanGan, Trust 
(2005), Civic (2005), Gruperten05, Grupativo05,  P-GrupKK05, O-GrupKK05, 
Analf15anos80
The results are expressed in the following equation,18 which has an adjusted 
coeffi cient of determination (R²) of 0.659.19
(1)  ConfMédiaInstPúb =  0.648 ConfGrandEmp + 0.281 TxvarPNB + 0.190 
Trust (2005) + e
Note that there is a functional relationship between institutional performance, 
as measured by average trust in the institutions, and the remaining variables in the 
equation: trust in large companies, the growth rate of gross national product and 
generalized trust. The other independent variables that were also present in the 
regression test were excluded by the stepwise method. 
The interpretation of the above equation is that trust in public institutions is 
related to trust in large companies (private sector), with a regression coeffi cient 
of 0.648 (sig 0.000) 20 and with economic performance (TxvarPNB), where the 
regression coeffi cient is 0.281 (sig 0.003).21 This implies that trust in government 
and institutional performance are not disconnected from material reality or 
economic factors, as asserted by the socioeconomic hypothesis. Rather, there 
is trust in government when there is trust in the economic system. This result 
is not surprising, since it is elementary that in countries that have shown good 
economic performance with high growth rates of national product for years, the 
trend is increased public trust in institutions. The equation shows that trust in 
public institutions, although showing a weak regression coeffi cient of 0.190 (sig 
0.032)22 is positively related to trust in general, i.e. the more generalized the trust, 
the greater the trust in institutions. 
But what factors determine generalized trust? What explains the reliance on big 
business and economic performance? To answer these questions it is necessary to 
explain what determines trust in large companies, the growth rate of gross national 
product and trust.
Regression tests were performed to check this. We used the stepwise method, 
including its potential independent variables mentioned above, but with each 
variable retained in equation (1) as the dependent variable. The tests are reproduced 
below.
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Trust (2005) as the dependent variable
The results are presented in the following equation, which has an adjusted 
coeffi cient of determination R² of 0.457:23
(2) Trust (2005) = - 0.737 GiniNetSolt80-85 – 0.430 ReconvKista + e
Note that among all variables in the regression test, only GiniNetSolt80-85 
remained, with a regression coeffi cient of -0.737, as well as the capitalist conversion 
variable, with a regression coeffi cient of -0.430.
These results show that, without doubt, trust depends on the distribution of 
income, i.e. in countries where there is greater income inequality, trust is lower. 
At the same time – and as was expected – trust was shown to be relatively lower in 
countries that have experienced capitalist conversion due to political turbulence 
and institutional disorganization inherent in any revolutionary processes.  
It is worth remembering that in the previous equation, trust (Trust 2005) appears 
as a proxy variable determinant of institutional performance (ConfMédiaInstPúb) but 
the reverse is not true: using the variable Trust (2005) as the dependent variable, the 
variable ConfMédiaInstPúb is excluded from the regression. The other two variables 
maintained in equation (1) but excluded from equation (2) are trust in large companies 
(ConfGrandEmpr) and growth rates of gross national product (TxvarPNB). This 
shows that these variables do not infl uence trust. Note that trust in large companies 
appears in equation (1) as the main explanatory variable of trust in public institutions, 
followed by the growth rate of gross national product variable and the trust variable. 
This occurs when the trust in large companies variable (ConfGranEmpr) is used as 
the dependent variable in a stepwise regression test, where all variables are present 
but only those with signifi cant results in determining the dependent variable remain.
The results of this test are produced in the following equation, which has an 
adjusted determination coeffi cient R² of 0.614:24
(3) ConfGrandEmp = 0.716 ConfMédiaInstPúb + 0.256 GiniNetSolt80-85 + e
While transformed into a dependent variable, it should be noted that trust in 
large companies is a direct function of trust, with a regression coeffi cient of 0.716 
(sig 0.000) – corroborating the result obtained in equation (1) – and of income 
distribution (Gini), with a regression coeffi cient of 0.256 (sig 0.007). It is worth 
noting that this result explains the exclusion of the variable GiniNetSolt80-85 
in equation (1), as the distribution of income is not directly related to trust in 
public institutions, but is represented in both generalized trust and in trust in large 
companies.
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According to equation (1), the other variable that infl uences trust in public 
institutions is the growth rate of gross national product - TxvarPNB. This variable 
is considered in our study as a measure of economic performance. As used by 
Knack and Keefer (1997), economic performance is a dynamic variable observed 
over the study period, unlike the socioeconomic development variable used by 
Putnam et al, which was measured at the end of each period. 
To check the effect of other potential independent variables in economic 
performance, the variable ConfMediaInstPub (institutional performance) was 
removed from the regression test presented below,25 but all other potential 
independent variables were used. The results of this test are produced in the 
following equations, which has a coeffi cient of determination R² of 0.584:26
 (4)  TxvarPNB =  - 1.120 ReconvKista  - 0.534 PNBpercapinper – 0.518 Civic 
(2005)  - 0.457 GiniNetSolt80-85  - 0.275 Grupativo05 + e
According to the results of equation (4), economic performance measured 
by TxvarPNB is an inverse function of capitalist restructuring, with a regression 
coeffi cient of -1.120 (sig 0.000). This result shows that the variation rate of gross 
national product is lower in countries that have experienced capitalist conversion 
than in those that did not experience this process, either because they preserved 
socialist institutions (even if within a more open market, like China and Vietnam), 
or because they have not gone through any revolutionary processes or revolution 
against socialism (as it is the case in most countries in the sample, which operated 
as market systems throughout the considered period).
The negative regression coeffi cients (-0.534, sig = 0.000) of the gross national 
product per capita at the beginning of the period show that the poorest countries 
(with a lower per capita national product in the early period) grow at higher rates, 
i.e. they show a growth rate of gross national product larger than those initially 
richer (higher per capita national product in the beginning of the period).
The most interesting result reproduced in equation (4) is that the civism variable 
(Civic (2005)) and active groups variable (Grupativo05) appear in the regression 
with a negative sign. Civism has a regression coeffi cient of -0.518 (sig = 0.000), 
and the active groups variable has a regression coeffi cient of -0.275 (sig = 0.022). 
This shows an inverse functional relationship between variables, i.e., the civism 
and active groups variables each have a negative effect on the determination of 
economic performance and consequently on institutional performance, contrary to 
the results achieved by Putnam et al in his study.
Income distribution (GiniNetSolt80-85), however, remains in the equation 
with a relevant regression coeffi cient () of -0.457 (sig 0.002), showing that in 
countries where income inequality is greater, economic performance is smaller. 
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Keefer and Knack (1997) suggest, the civism variable is not a reliable variable, 
as answers given by individuals in surveys may not correspond to the attitudes 
of these individuals in their day to day lives and thus may not refl ect actual 
behavior.27 Because of this, another test was conducted without the presence of 
those variables, (civism and groups).28 The adjusted coeffi cient of determination 
R² was equal to 0.396:29
(5)  TxvarPNB = -0.733 ReconvKista – 0.556 PNBpercapinper – 0.403 
GiniNetSolt80-85 + e
The results of equation (5) reaffi rm the results of equation (4), as the variable 
GiniNetSolt80-85 is still present, with a regression coeffi cient of -0.403 (sig 0.011), 
as well as the ReconvKista variable, with a regression coeffi cient of -0.733 (sig 
0.000) and the PNBpercapinper variable, with a regression coeffi cient of -0.556 
(sig 0.000).
Importantly, income distribution (GiniNetSolt80-85) surpasses the generalized 
trust variable, the variables that measure trust in the system, namely ConfGrandEmp, 
TrComp, ExGanGan, and also the variable Analf15anos80, which was excluded 
by the stepwise method on this regression test.
Therefore, all of our attempts to break down equation (1) further yielded results 
with the presence of income distribution as an explanatory variable in determining 
the dependent variables, i.e., the Gini variable is present in the explanation of 
economic performance, trust in large companies and generalized trust. Because 
these three variables are explanatory of institutional performance, it was 
concluded that the distribution of income is, ultimately, one of the determinants 
of institutional performance. With these results, we conclude that one of the 
determinations of Putnam et al’s civic community is the distribution of income. 
Thus, civic community is a function of, among other things, generalized trust, 
which itself is a function (although not exclusively) of Gini.
CONCLUSIONS
Our hypothesis that income inequality is a determinant of generalized trust and 
thus of institutional performance has empirical support. Using a larger and more 
updated database and a statistical technique of linear regression with the stepwise 
method we were able to demonstrate that institutional performance,30 which is 
the dependent variable in Putnam et al’s model, is explained by the variables for 
trust in large companies, rate variation of gross national product and generalized 
trust. All other independent variables considered here as potential determinants 
of institutional performance were excluded from the model by the statistical 
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software. The civism variable, considered by Putnam et al as the main determinant 
of institutional performance, was expelled from the stepwise regression model, not 
because there is high correlation between it and the trust variable, but because it 
was not statistically signifi cant. This result cannot be interpreted as demonstrating 
the irrelevance of civism. In fact, it is believed that the exclusion of this variable 
is due, fi rst of all, to the fact that the WVS items on civism relies solely on the 
statements of respondents about their willingness to adopt socially sanctioned 
behaviors. The variables for trust, as well as “trust in the system” and trust in 
large companies, eventually absorb the functions that Putnam et al assigns to the 
civic community itself (which he evaluates mainly through participation in mutual 
support groups).
But if the above argument is correct, to what extent is it possible to state that 
the results obtained here suggest changes to Putnam et al’s thesis? According 
to our interpretation in this article, the results suggest changes to this thesis as 
Putnam et al does not strongly highlight the difference between “civic and cultural 
determinations” and “socioeconomic” determinations. 
From the point of view adopted in this article, a certain level of civism is 
essential in order to bring transaction costs within the market down suffi ciently 
to allow the economic system to innovate and develop. Civism is a category of 
“culture” with a socioeconomic foundation. We feel that Putnam et al simplifi ed 
the matter, and that this simplifi cation led him to not adequately highlight the 
material determinations of civic culture.
 Finally, the last regression model performed in our study suggest that, in 
addition to “trust” and “trust in large companies,” institutional performance is also 
a function of economic performance. This merits two observations. Firstly, since 
we used a stepwise method, which excludes any variable that has high correlation 
with others, it is clear that economic performance is not an exclusive function of 
culture or an institutional framework marked by a high degree of trust and low 
transaction costs. When one examines the determinants of economic performance, 
income distribution is among them. Income distribution – which is at the basis 
of trust – is an important variable for growth, beyond its impact on culture. In 
short, civism, generalized trust, trust in public and private institutions appear to be 
essential. But they should be taken neither as a starting point, nor as a suffi cient 
variable to explain economic development.
NOTES
1  We base our reconsideration of this work on the Portuguese translation of this book: 
Putnam, Robert D.; Leonardi, R.; Nanetti, R.Y. 2005. Comunidade e democracia: 
a experiência da Itália moderna. 4 ed. Rio de Janeiro: Editora da FGV.
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2  We thank Putnam et al who provided his dataset to the authors of this article; all the 
correlations and factor analyses that led to his main variables have been rerun by the authors.
3 Primarily correlation analysis and multivariate regressions with stepwise techniques.
4  The representativeness of the sample is verifi ed by a patch made with a weighting variable 
that provides the weight value for the respondent in each country. Some countries have 
a weight value of one, resulting in no correction for that country. The reason for this has 
not been verifi ed within the documentation of WVS/EVS.
5  The indicator of institutional performance used by Putnam et al is composed of cabinet 
stability, budget promptness, statistical and information services, reform legislation, 
legislative innovation, number of day care, number of familiar clinics, industrial policy 
instruments, ability to make expenditures in agriculture, local sanitary unit expenditures, 
housing and urban development and sensitivity of the bureaucracy.
6  The construction of the civism and trust variables are based on the questions asked in the 
version of the WVS questionnaire used in Brazil in 2006.
7  The questions used in this article refer to the instrument applied to Brazil by the Center 
for Public Opinion Research at the University of Brasilia DATAUnB - Applied Social 
Research, 2006.
8  Item (b) was not used by Knack and Keefer, as reported in the footnote (24) on page 
1272, because there are few countries with data reported for this item in WVS - 1990. 
However, due to the importance of that item in the study by Putnam et al, it was reconciled 
with Knack and Keefer’s item (h), youth organization, and maintained in this work.
9  Our item (h) was considered to be an amalgamation of Knack and Keefer’s items (a), 
social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or needy persons, and (g), third world 
development or human rights organizations.
10  Item (i) is not in the instrument used in years 81 and 90, so it was excluded in the 
construction of variable Groups - 2005.
11  Because the WVS - 81 is equivalent to WVS - 90, the compatibility of information 
reaches the entire period under consideration.
12  It is important to emphasize also that a correlation test was performed for the variables 
Groups, P-groups and O-groups, with results below our expectations due to changes in 
these variables during the period.
13  This process of harmonization related to the three periods result in the presence or 
absence of some indicators. For example: item (f) community local actions towards 
issues such as poverty, employment, housing and racial equality, were excluded because 
they were not present on WVS-. 2005/2006.
14 Source: World Economic Outlook, 2009, FMI.
15 Source: World Economic Outlook, 2009, FMI.
16 For discussion, see Frederick Solt at www.siuc.edu/~fsolt/.
17  In a classic Monte Carlo study, Boomsma (1982) evaluated the robustness of Confi rmatory 
Factor Analysis solutions for small N (25–400). He found that the percentage of proper 
solutions, the accuracy of parameter estimates, the sampling variability in parameter 
estimates, and the appropriateness of the Maximum Likelihood x2 test statistic were 
all favorably infl uenced by larger values of N (see also Boomsma & Hoogland, 2001; 
Gerbing & Anderson, 1993). He recommended that N should be at least 100, but that 
200 or more was desirable. Marsh et al. (1998) and others (e.g. MacCallum, Widaman, 
Zhang & Hong, 1999; Velicer & Fava, 1998) argued that concerns about the minimum N 
for factor analysis have produced many guidelines but limited empirical research.
18 The full models is available upon request to the authors.
19 The values of the variables correspond to standardized regression coeffi cients ().
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20  The regression coeffi cient () shows the effect of individual independent variables on 
the dependent variable in standard deviation units. In statistical terms this result means 
that for every additional unit of standard deviation for trust in large companies, the trust 
in public institutions increases on average 0.648 standard deviation units.
21  This means that for every additional unit of standard deviation for the rate of change of 
gross national product, the average trust in public institutions increases on average 0.281 
standard deviation units.
22  This means that for every additional unit of standard deviation for generalized trust, trust 
in public institutions increases on average 0.190 standard deviation units.
23 The values of the variables correspond to standardized regression coeffi cients ().
24 The values of the variables correspond to standardized regression coeffi cients ().
25  As mentioned previously, the variable TxvarPNB alone does not explain trust in 
institutions, because the infl uence of economic performance on institutional performance 
seems obvious, so we chose to exclude the variable trust in institutions from the list of 
potential independent variables in explaining economic performance.
26 The values of the variables correspond to standardized regression coeffi cients ().
27  We argue that the variable Grupativo05 is a variable of low reliability for two reasons: 1) 
because the division / classifi cation of groups in various surveys in the WVS has changed 
over time, and 2) because interviewees’ statements as “belonging” or “not belonging” 
to an organization / association cannot be taken as a strictly faithful expression of their 
degree of participation.
28 Here the excluded variables are: Gruperten05, Grupativo05, P-and O-GrupKK05.
29 The values of the variables correspond to standardized regression coeffi cients ().
30  It is worth noting that Putnam et al recognizes and confi rms that the measure of institutional 
performance is highly correlated with popular participation and satisfaction. Therefore, 
if the population participates and is pleased with the performance of government, it relies 
on public institutions. Thus, the measure of institutional performance used in this article, 
namely trust in public institutions is feasible.
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